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URING the Survey period the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of evidence. The cases
of greatest significance arose in the following substantive areas:
(1) Article I-General Provisions; (2) Article II-Judicial Notice; (3) Bur-
den of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article IV-Relevancy and
Its Limits; (5) Article V-Privileges; (6) Article VI-Witnesses; (7) Article
VII-Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII-Hearsay; (9) Arti-
cle IX-Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X--Contents of
Writings, Recordings and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article I of the Texas Rules of Evidence' contains many important sub-
stantive provisions. Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides that admission
or exclusion of evidence is not error "unless a substantial right of the party is
affected .... ." Whether a substantial right of the party is affected depends
upon the facts of the particular case. For example, in Neily v. Aaron,2 a
court of appeals held that the exclusion of certain testimony did not affect
any of the appellant's substantial rights, while in Portland Savings & Loan
Association v. Bernstein 3 a court of appeals held that the exclusion of evi-
dence did deprive appellant of a substantial right.
Texas rules require that a timely objection or motion to strike appear in
the trial record as a prerequisite to appeal of an evidentiary ruling.4 In Masi
v. Scheel 5 the appellant's failure to object precluded the appeal of any error.
To preserve error for appeal, the objection must state the specific grounds for
objection if the specific grounds are not apparent from the context. 6 In
Stedman v. Stedman 7 the court held that a general objection that did not
state the grounds for objection failed to preserve error.
* J.D. University of Texas. Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Effective January 1, 1988, the Texas Rules of Evidence were renamed the Texas Rules
of Civil Evidence. Since this article deals with evidence rulings prior to the name change, the
old citation form is used throughout.
2. 724 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
3. 716 S.W.2d 532, 540 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
4. TEX. R. EvID. 103(a)(1).
5. 724 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
6. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(l).
7. 731 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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Texas rules also provide that a party may not appeal a ruling excluding
evidence unless the substance of the evidence was made known to the court
or was apparent from the context. 8 In Life Insurance Co. of the Southwest v.
Brister9 the court of appeals found that excluded testimony regarding the
appellee's withdrawal as a representative party from a similar federal class
action had a direct bearing on whether the case at bar should be certified as a
class action. The court of appeals held that the error was not reversible
"because appellants failed to meet their burden of showing that these errors
were reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause a rendition of an
improper judgment."'10
Although article VII governs opinion and expert testimony, Texas Rule of
Evidence 104(a) provides that preliminary questions regarding the qualifica-
tion of all witnesses shall be made by the court. An expert need not base his
opinions on admissible facts or data so long as the opinions are based on the
type of information used by experts in the same field.1 ' In Souris v. Robin-
son 12 the court held that the trial court must make a preliminary determina-
tion whether experts in the field reasonably rely on particular data.
Applying the clearly erroneous standard the court of appeals affirmed exclu-
sion of the portions of an expert's testimony not based on the type of infor-
mation reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 13
Authentication and identification, governed by article IX of both the
Texas and Federal Rules of Evidence, relate to relevancy.14 Both the Texas
and federal rules provide that when the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit the evidence,
subject to later introduction of evidence fulfilling the condition. 15 In In Re
Bobby Boggs, Inc. 16 the Fifth Circuit found that the condition of fact rele-
vant to the authenticity of certain bonds had been fulfilled pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104(b).
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a) the court must, upon request, give a
limiting instruction when evidence is admitted as to one party or for one
purpose, but not as to another party or for another purpose. In Larson v.
Cactus Utility Co. 17 the Texas Supreme Court held that, absent a request for
a limiting instruction, appellant waived his complaint.
Texas Rule of Evidence 106 is commonly known as the "rule of optional
8. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). Effective January 1, 1988, the rule was amended to delete
the "apparent from context" provision.
9. 722 S.W.2d 764, 776-77 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
10. Id. at 777.
11. TEX. R. EvID. 703.
12. 725 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
13. Id.
14. "Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of relevancy .... This
requirement of showing authenticity . . . falls in the category of relevancy dependent upon
fulfillment of a condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b)."
FED. R. EvID. 901(a) (advisory committee's note).
15. FED. R. EvID. 104(b); TEX. R. EvID. 104(b).
16. 819 F.2d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 1987).
17. 730 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1987).
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completeness."' 8 When one side introduces all or part of a writing or re-
cording, an adverse party may at that time introduce any other part or any
other writing that in fairness should be considered contemporaneously with
the admitted evidence. 19 In Azar Nut Co. v. Caille20 the court of appeals
affirmed the admission of a letter written by the appellee's attorney that re-
sponded to a letter offered by the appellant.
II. ARTICLE II-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice. During
the Survey period courts affirmed taking judicial notice of prior judgments2'
and of a city charter. 22 Without referencing the rules of evidence, another
court judicially noticed that the Tarrant County Child Support Office was a
section of the Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office.2 3 An appellate
court may take judicial notice for the first time on appeal. 24 An appellate
court cannot, however, judicially notice local court rules unless the local
rules have been filed with the Texas Supreme Court. 25
Texas Rule of Evidence 202 governs the determination of laws of other
states. The rule permits a court to take judicial notice of the "constitutions,
public statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, court decisions, and common
law of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States."'26
The federal rules lack a comparable provision. In Kucel v. Walter E. Heller
& Co.,27 however, the Fifth Circuit held that federal courts must take judi-
cial notice of the laws of other states.
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerns presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Evidence lack a corresponding article III, Texas
common law continues to govern the law of presumptions. One court of
appeals held that absent evidence of an appraisal district's use of a correct
address on a notice of reappraisal, no presumption of delivery to the tax-
payer arises.28 Another court of appeals, however, held that a court clerk's
18. See Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd,
734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987); cf TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 107 (entitled "Rule of Optional
Completeness").
19. TEX. R. EvID. 106.
20. 720 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
21. Pitts v. State, 734 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. App.-Waco, 1987, no pet.); Kay v. Sandler,
718 S.W.2d 872, 873-74 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)..
23. Ex parte Parrott, 723 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
24. City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
25. Petitt v. Laware, 715 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
26. TEX. R. EvID. 202.
27. 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987).
28. Uvalde County Appraisal Dist. v. F.T. Kincaid Estate, 720 S.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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testimony that she personally prepared docket notices and properly ad-
dressed them to a law firm and description of the district clerk's office's cus-
tomary mailing procedure raised a presumption that the law firm received
the notices.29 During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court wrote
that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(a) establishes a presumption that an
addressee receives a notice of trial setting if properly addressed and mailed
with prepaid postage.30 The court, however, added that the presumption is
not evidence, and "it vanishes when opposing evidence is introduced that the
letter was not received." '31
IV. ARTICLE IV-RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically governs relevancy
and its limits. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise pro-
vided by constitution, by statute, or by other rules. 32 Evidence that is not
relevant is not admissible. 33
Several cases during the Survey period considered the relevancy of certain
evidence. Evidence of the price realized on the sale of nearby property was
held relevant to establish the value of condemned property.34 Another court
held that evidence of the price a husband received from the sale of commu-
nity-owned insurance agencies two years after a divorce was relevant in his
former wife's suit to set aside a property settlement on the grounds of
fraud.35 The Houston court of appeals found that letters from a steel buyer's
attorney to a seller allegedly admitting the disputed debt were improperly
excluded as irrelevant in an action on an account, because the court could
draw an inference from the attorney's letters that the account existed. 36 Cit-
ing neither a rule of evidence nor any case law to support its holding, the
court of appeals in Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kennedy37
held .that the exclusion of certain immaterial evidence, even though relevant,
was harmless error, if error at all.
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence on
special grounds such as unfair prejudice or confusion or if the evidence is
merely cumulative. During the Survey period one court excluded prejudicial
records about a joint venturer's independent construction project involving
the collapse of a trench causing deaths and leading to indictments. 38 An-
29. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. City of Arlington, 718 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ).
30. Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987).
31. Id.
32. TEX. R. EvID. 402. For the definition of relevance, see TEX. R. EVID. 401.
33. TEX. R. EvID. 402.
34. State v. Taylor, 721 S.W.2d 541, 550 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. Rathmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6, 19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
36. Peregrine Metals Group, Inc. v. Leervig, 734 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
37. 732 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Lovelace v. Sabine Consol., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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other court excluded evidence that a child at the center of an abduction case
was the plaintiff's adoptive, rather than natural, son.39 The Fifth Circuit
used Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which is identical to Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 403, to exclude the testimony of an expert who based his opinion on
unreliable information.40
With certain narrow exceptions, character is not admissible to prove con-
duct on a particular occasion. 41 A court held that evidence concerning a
joint venturer's independent construction project was inadmissible to show
his propensity towards negligence. 42 Another court held that evidence
showing that a tenant lied in an unrelated matter was inadmissible in the
tenant's personal injury action against an apartment complex and manage-
ment company. 43 Evidence of other wrongs or acts is not admissible proof
of a person's character to show that he acted in conformity with the other
acts. 44 In an insurer's action for a declaration that it was not liable to its
insured due to arson, the court held that the insured's past insurance claims
were admissible to show motive, opportunity, and intent.45
Texas Rule of Evidence 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, except when offered for a purpose other than merely proving the
subsequent remedial measures. In an insured's action on a group long-term
disability policy, a court admitted evidence of a different policy issued by the
insurer to a different insured for the purpose of impeaching the insurer's
position that the policy language was ambiguous. 46 In a negligence action to
recover for the death of a flagman, an oil well owner's subsequent remedial
measures were admitted to prove he controlled the well and to prove the
feasibility of certain precautionary measures. 47
Texas Rule of Evidence 408 excludes evidence of compromise and offers
to compromise when offered to prove liability or the invalidity of a claim or
its amount. The rule does not, however, require the exclusion of compro-
mise evidence offered for other purposes.48 For example, a court admitted
evidence of settlement negotiations on the question of whether a plaintiff
failed to mitigate damages. 49 The Corpus Christi court of appeals admitted
evidence of settlement negotiations, not to show liability, but to prove al-
leged misrepresentations. 50 Another court admitted a dealer's letter to a
39. Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. 1986).
40. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422-24 (5th Cir. 1987).
41. TEX. R. EvID. 404.
42. Lovelace v. Sabine Consol., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
43. Nix v. H.R. Management Co., 733 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. TEX. R. EvID. 404(b).
45. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 666 F. Supp. 950, 954 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
46. Jones v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1397, 1400-01 (5th Cir. 1986).
47. Exxon Corp. v. Roberts, 724 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id.
49. Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1103 (5th Cir. 1987).
50. Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 537 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
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manufacturer making certain demands on the manufacturer because the let-
ter was less an offer of compromise and more in the nature of an
ultimatum. 51
A settlement agreement in which a plaintiff agrees to pay one of several
defendants a part of any judgment recovered from nonsettling defendants is
called a Mary Carter agreement.5 2 Whether an agreement is a Mary Carter
agreement is sometimes at issue, as in Turner v. Monsanto Co. 53 In Turner
the court held that the settling indemnitor did not obtain a direct financial
interest in the plaintiff's recovery, and evidence of the agreement was not
admissible. 54 Similarly, the Corpus Christi court of appeals excluded evi-
dence of a Mary Carter agreement when the agreement would not show bias
or prejudice on the part of the owner of an oncoming vehicle nor show the
interest of a witness or party.55
V. ARTICLE V-PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs privileges. No person
has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter 56 unless the rules of evidence
recognize the privilege 57 or a statute58 or constitution59 grants the privilege.
A person or entity making a report required by law has a privilege to
refuse to disclose the report if the law requiring the report creates a privi-
lege. 6° Texas Rule of Evidence 502 requires Texas courts to honor a foreign
jurisdiction's privilege when that jurisdiction forbids the reporting of certain
information.61 The Texas Supreme Court, however, ruled that, absent evi-
dence of a privilege, a privilege will not be recognized. 62
Texas Rule of Evidence 503 codifies the common law lawyer-client privi-
lege. The lawyer-client privilege protects both an attorney's statements and
advice and a client's communications. 63 A court held that the attorney-cli-
ent privilege protected documents in the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation's recruiting violation files, containing information communicated for
51. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 857 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
52. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. 1977).
53. 717 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
54. Id.
55. Bounds v. Scurlock Oil Co., 730 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
56. TEX. R. EvID. 501(2).
57. See TEX. R. EvID. 502-510.
58. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1988), repealed by
TEX. R. EvID. 509-510 (eff. September 1, 1983) as to civil actions and TEX. R. CRIM. EVID.
509-510 (eff. September 1, 1986) as to criminal cases (confidential communications between
physician and patient relating to professional services rendered by physician privileged).
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
60. TEX. R. EvID. 502.
61. Cf Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing existence of privi-
lege of "ongoing criminal investigation").
62. Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1987).




the purpose of obtaining legal advice, from disclosure" under the Texas
Open Records Act.65 Another court used the attorney-client privilege to
protect communications between an attorney and a client after an alleged
fraud, because one purpose of the privilege is to facilitate discussion of possi-
ble legal defenses. 66
According to the Fifth Circuit, communications between an attorney and
a government witness were not privileged when the witness's untruthful
statements to the attorney supported false statements made under oath
before a grand jury. 67 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a
letter from a party's attorney to the trial judge was not privileged, since the
court could not discover a basis for the privilege in any constitution, statutes,
or rules. 68
Texas Rule of Evidence 509 details the physician-patient privilege. A pa-
tient is a person consulting a physician for medical care.69 In Tarrant
County Hospital District v. Hughes70 a discovering party asked the hospital
to produce the names of donors supplying the blood used in transfusions
received by a patient who contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome. The court held that because nothing in the record indicated that a
physician saw or treated the donors when they donated blood, the physician-
patient privilege did not apply to the discovery request.7 1 Texas Rule of
Evidence 509(d)(7) creates an exception to the physician-patient privilege for
involuntary civil commitment proceedings. In Dudley v. Texas72 the court
held that the physician-patient privilege did not protect communications be-
tween a physician and a patient after the patient's involuntary detention
when the physician informed the patient that the communications were not
confidential.
Several cases decided during the Survey period considered the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings73 the Fifth Circuit held that an individual does not enjoy a Fifth
Amendment privilege protecting the records of a collective entity. The court
explained that the custodian of corporate records cannot invoke the Fifth
Amendment, irrespective of how small the corporation is. 74 In Smith v.
Smith75 a court of appeals held that witnesses, who asserted their Fifth
64. Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1087 (W.D. Tex.
1986).
65. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
66. Synair Corp. v. American Indus. Tire, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
67. United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 95 L.Ed.2d
843, 107 S.Ct. 2187 (1987).
68. Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 540 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
69. TEX. R. EVID. 509(a)(1).
70. 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
71. Id. at 677.
72. 730 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
73. 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Braswell v. United States, 98
L.Ed.2d 28, 108 S.Ct. 64 (1987).
74. Id. (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974)).
75. 720 S.W.2d 586, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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Amendment privilege in their deposition and who failed to keep the asser-
tion of the privilege from the jury by making a motion in limine, could not
seek to exclude the deposition testimony. The court also affirmed the trial
court's decision not to give the parties' requested instruction relating to as-
sertion of their Fifth Amendment rights, since there was no evidence that
the failure to give the instruction caused an improper verdict.76
VI. ARTICLE VI-WITNESSES
Texas courts have deemed the Texas dead man's statute77 repealed in civil
actions by adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 601(b), which applies only to uncorroborated oral statements in ac-
tions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, replaced the
dead man's statute. The Texas Supreme Court reviewed only one case in-
volving the dead man's statute during the Survey period, In re Estate of
Watson,78 and decided the case under the now repealed article 3716. In
Watson the supreme court held that letters offered to show the affection be-
tween the testatrix and the proponent of the will were not precluded by arti-
cle 3716, which deals only with a witness's capacity to testify on a particular
matter.79
In Sawyer v. Lancaster80 the court of appeals held that a decedent's oral
statement concerning his wishes for the division of his estate and bank ac-
count were inadmissible without corroboration under Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 601(b). In Tuttle v. Simpson 8 the court of appeals held that Rule
601(b) applied to testimony about a testator's oral statements accompanying
his gestures which allegedly pointed out a boundary. The Tuttle court ex-
plained that without the admission of the oral statements accompanying the
testator's gestures the gesturing would have been meaningless.8 2 The court
held that the dead man's statute did not bar the testator's son's testimony
because the son and the testator's widow were not adverse on the issue of the
location of twenty acres devised to a third party.83 Texas Rule of Evidence
602 provides that a witness may not testify to a matter unless he has personal
knowledge, except as provided in Rule 703 governing opinion testimony by
expert witnesses. In Penwell v. Barrett84 the court held it was proper to
exclude testimony offered in violation of Rule 703's first-hand knowledge
requirement.
A judge presiding at a trial may not testify as a witness in that trial.85 In
76. Id. at 595.
77. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926), repealed by TEX. R. EVID. (eff.
Sept. 1, 1983) and TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. (eff. Sept. 1, 1986).
78. 720 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. 1986).
79. Id. at 807.
80. 719 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. 735 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 542-43.
84. 724 S.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
85. FED. R. EvID. 604; TEX. R. EvID. 605.
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Jones v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co. 8 6 the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of its
original order denying the insured's motion for summary judgment.87
Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that specific instances of a wit-
ness's conduct are not admissible for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness's credibility, except for the use of prior criminal convictions as
provided by Rule 609. Several cases during the Survey period excluded evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct. Evidence concerning a joint ven-
turer's solo construction project involving a collapsed trench that caused
deaths and resulted in indictments was inadmissible to impeach the ven-
turer's honesty or credibility in an action against the joint venture.88 The
San Antonio court of appeals held that evidence that a tenant lied in an
unrelated matter was not admissible in the tenant's action against an apart-
ment complex and management company.8 9 In another case the San
Antonio court ruled that testimony by a former business partner concerning
a defendant's unspecified falsehoods was properly excluded under Rule
608(b).90
Texas rules authorize courts to admit evidence of prior felony convic-
tions.91 The circumstances under which a court may admit evidence of a
conviction, however, are narrowly circumscribed. In Juan A. v. Dallas
County Child Welfare92 the court held that the "pendency of an appeal ren-
ders evidence of a conviction inadmissible."
Texas Rule of Evidence 611, governing writings used to refresh a person's
memory, provides that if a writing is used to refresh a witness's memory an
adverse party may review the writing at the hearing.93 In Portland Savings
& Loan Association v. Bernstein94 the court of appeals held that the trial
court has the discretion to require production of documents a witness used
to refresh his memory before his testimony.95
Texas Rule of Evidence 612 governs the use of prior statements to im-
peach or support a witness's testimony. 96 In Jacobini v. Hall9 7 evidence of
86. 800 F.2d 1397, 1400 (5th Cir. 1986).
87. Id. The court stated there was no authority or rationale for a pre-trial ruling being
relevant to a fact issue. Thus, absent statutory authority to the contrary, Rule 605 appeared to
govern. Id.
88. Lovelace v. Sabine Consol., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
89. Nix v. H.R. Management Co., 733 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
91. TEX. R. EvID. 609; TEX. R. EVID. 803(22).
92. 726 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (citing TEX. R. EvID. 609(e)).
93. TEX. R. EVID. 611. Effective January 1, 1988, this rule was renumbered as 612.
94. 716 S.W.2d 532, 541 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
95. Id. The appellate court gave no explanation for its holding, but the trial court had
quashed subpoenas seeking the documents as prohibited by state law. Id. at 540-51. Addition-
ally, the appellate court found testimony of the refreshed witness cumulative of other testi-
mony and thus lack of document production harmless. Id. at 541.
96. TEX. R. EVID. 612. Effective January 1, 1988 this rule was renumbered as 613.
97. 719 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1988]
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prior claims against the defendant alleging negligent entrustment of vehicles
was admissible to impeach the defendant's inconsistent testimony that he
had not previously been accused of negligent entrustment. Another court
held that prior inconsistent statements in superceded pleadings were admis-
sible to impeach a party's testimony. 98 In another case the hostile dissolu-
tion of the witness's business relationship was held properly admitted to
show bias against the alleged purchaser of real property.99 The court also
held that the specific allegations made in the witness's dissolution lawsuit
were irrelevant to the issues in the present case.'°°
VII. ARTICLE VII-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Lay Opinion
Texas rules permit lay witnesses to offer rationally based opinions to help
clarify facts or misunderstandings.' 0 ' The rules have greatly liberalized the
admission of lay witnesses' opinion testimony. Texas law has always been
liberal in allowing an owner of property to offer his opinion of the property's
value. 102 A property owner can give opinion testimony even though he
would not qualify as an expert regarding the value of the same property if it
were owned by another person. 103 During the Survey period, two courts
allowed automobile buyers to testify as to actual values in establishing dam-
ages in breach of warranty actions even though the buyers did not state that
they knew market value and did not give the basis for their opinions.' °4
Another court held that even if the owner is not asked whether he is familiar
with the market value of his property, his opinion testimony is sufficient if it
refers to market value.10 5
A lay witness's mere conclusions, however, are not competent evidence. ' 0 6
The Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. 107 case took the admission of lay opinions
to new lengths by allowing Pennzoil's president to give his opinions concern-
ing the meaning of someone else's notes from a meeting he did not attend.
The Houston Court of Appeals held that Pennzoil's president's opinion testi-
mony did not constitute improper conclusory testimony that a binding con-
98. Tempo Tamers, Inc. v. Crow-Houston Four, Ltd., 715 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
100. Id.
101. TEX. R. EvID. 701.
102. Classified Parking System v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage competent to testify as to
car's value).
103. Id.
104. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 848-50 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Powell-Buick-Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bowers, 718 S.W.2d
12, 15 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 732 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1987, no writ).
106. Nicholson v. Memorial Hosp. System, 722 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. 729 S.W.2d 768, 838 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tract had been reached. 108
B. Competency of Expert
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert witness may testify if
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact in understanding evidence or
determining a fact in an issue. During the Survey period one court held that
a witness with little formal education but with nine years of experience in
building and repairing swimming pools was qualified as an expert to testify
on the cause of damage to a swimming pool. 10 9 Another court held exten-
sive experience and schooling in aeronautics qualified a witness as an expert
in the field of aeronautical engineering." 0 Yet another court held an ac-
counting expert had specialized knowledge to interpret the term "cost" as
used in an accounting provision."'
For a doctor to testify about a particular field of medicine, courts only
require the doctor to possess knowledge and skills not possessed by people
generally." 2 The Houston Court of Appeals allowed a board-certified anes-
thesiologist with a subspecialty in acute and chronic pain control to testify in
the field of urology because the testimony assisted the trier of fact in under-
standing a plaintiff's arachnoiditis.1 3 Another court, however, held that an
economist's testimony estimating the value of the loss of affection and com-
panionship between a deceased son and his mother, based upon the hourly
average income of a psychiatrist, was not admissible in a mother's wrongful
death and survival action.' ' The court reasoned that the average hourly
income of a psychiatrist was not relevant to the ultimate issue for the jury's
determination." 5 In another case, an unlicensed real estate appraiser with
ten years of experience in making appraisals qualified as an expert to ap-
praise condemned property." 6
C. Subject of Expert Testimony
1. Similar Transactions
Courts during the Survey period held that the amount realized on a sale of
nearby property was admissible to establish the value of the property at is-
sue." 7 Also, a court admitted an appraiser's testimony on land value even
108. Id.
109. Petrolia Ins. Co. v. Everett, 719 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1986, no writ).
110. Nichols Constr. Corp. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 808 F.2d 340, 354 (5th Cir. 1985).
111. Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 281-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98
L.Ed.2d 107, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987).
112. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v.. Wesbrooks, 511 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1974, no writ).
113. Burlington N. R.R. v. Harvey, 717 S.W.2d 371, 378 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. Scale v. Winn Exploration Co., 732 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, no writ).
115. Id.
116. State v. Taylor, 721 S.W.2d 541, 551 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. United States v. 24.48 Acres of Land, 812 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1987); State v.
Taylor, 721 S.W.2d 541, 550 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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though the appraiser based his estimate on a value-in-use theory rather than
a market value theory.11 8 A court of appeals held that an expert appraiser's
failure to rely on the value of comparable rental property affected the weight
and credibility of his testimony and not the admissibility of the estimate.1 1 9
2. Testimony of Medical Experts
The trier of fact usually determines the issue of causation, even when ex-
pert testimony demonstrates probable causation.' 20 The patient bears the
burden of proof in a medical malpractice case.' 2 l The patient must prove
that the physician undertook treatment a reasonable and prudent doctor
would not have undertaken under the same or similar circumstances. 22
One case during the Survey period held that testimony regarding mere medi-
cal possibilities failed to establish a causal connection between an injury and
the alleged negligence. 123 In a similar case, a court affirmed the exclusion of
testimony referring to a mere medical possibility rather than a reasonable
medical probability.' 24 The El Paso court of appeals upheld the admission
of a physician's testimony as to the extent of work-related injuries, even
though the physician never treated the injured worker, since the physician
based his testimony on the worker's history, notes from a physical examina-
tion, and X-ray findings. 25 A court of appeals also held that a psychiatrist's
testimony concerning a personal injury plaintiff's psychological problems
stemming from former incestuous relationships was admissible even though
it was not foreseeable that the automobile accident in question would cause
depression over those relationships. 26
D. Bases of Opinion Testimony
The facts forming the bases of expert opinion or inference must be the
type of facts reasonably relied on by experts in the same field.' 27 Whether
other experts in the field customarily rely on information is a matter for the
trial court's preliminary determination pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence
104(a).' 2 8 When an opinion is based upon facts or data customarily relied
118. State v. Kinsloe, 716 S.W.2d 699, 704-05 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
119. Hunt County Tax Appraisal Dist. v. Rubbermaid Inc., 719 S.W.2d 215, 222 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. 1970) (doctor testi-
fied as to possible causes for separation of sutures).
121. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
122. Id.
123. Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ
granted).
124. Tsai v. Wells, 725 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
125. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 729 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Padget v. Gray, 727 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
127. TEx. R. EvID. 703.




on by other experts in the field, an expert's opinion is admissible. 129 If the
data underlying the expert's opinion is not data reasonably relied on by
others in the field, an expert's opinion will be excluded.1 30 An expert's opin-
ion need not be generally accepted in the scientific community before it is
sufficiently reliable and probative for admission, and even controversial med-
ical testimony can support a jury finding of causation. 13
E. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
On October 28, 1987, the Texas Supreme Court resolved the previously
open question of whether an expert witness can opine on mixed questions of
law and fact.1 32 In Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital 133 the Texas
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of expert testimony indicating
that the defendant hospital's conduct constituted negligence, gross negli-
gence, and recklessness and that defendant's acts proximately caused the
plaintiffs' minor daughter's blindness. The supreme court wrote:
Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, such testimony is ad-
missible. Tex. R. Evid. 704. Fairness and efficiency dictate that an ex-
pert may state an opinion on a mixed question of law and fact as long as
the opinion is confined to the relevant issues and is based on proper
legal concepts.1 34
Hendricks v. Todora 135 was a summary judgment case in which the Texas
Supreme Court had granted a writ of error to consider whether an engineer's
affidavit raised an issue of fact as to foreseeability. The Dallas court of ap-
peals held that the engineer's affidavit embraced legal questions on which
expert opinion was not competent. 136 In his affidavit, the engineer opined
that a parking lot was unreasonably dangerous and that a drunk driver's
crashing through a restaurant's glass wall could have been reasonably antici-
pated. 137 The Texas Supreme Court initially granted a writ of error in Hen-
dricks on the same day it granted writ in Birchfield.138 Six weeks later,
however, the court withdrew the grant.139 The Texas Supreme Court ulti-
mately refused the application for writ of error, finding no reversible
error. 140
129. Lipsey v. Texas Dep't of Health, 727 S.W.2d 61, 72 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Polish Power, Inc., 720 S.W.2d 183, 192 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d
420 (5th Cir. 1987).
131. Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
99 L.Ed.2d 705 (1988)..
132. See Addison, Rule 704 Update: Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 50 TEx. B.J. 637
(1987); Addison, Rule 704 and the Law: Not A Matter of Opinion, 50 TEX. B.J. 383 (1987).
133. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 36 (Oct. 28, 1987).
134. Id. at 37.
135. 722 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. Id. at 465.
137. Id.
138. 30 Tex. S. Ct. J. 345, 346 (Apr. 8, 1987).




F Effect of Opinion Testimony
Although opinion testimony does not establish material facts as a matter
of law,' 41 an expert witness's uncontradicted testimony must be taken as
true as to the facts it establishes. 142 As a general rule, however, an expert's
inferences, even when uncontroverted, are not conclusive on the trier of
fact. 143 The expert's inference is conclusive, however, if the subject is one
for experts or skilled witnesses alone, and upon which a jury or court cannot
form correct opinions based upon other evidence and their own experiences
and knowledge. 144 For example, the Texas Supreme Court held the issue of
the reasonable cost of house repairs is not for determination by experts or
skilled witnesses alone. 145 When expert testimony establishes the use of sub-
standard building materials and procedures violating the building codes, it is
proper to impute knowledge of industry standards to a person in the business
of building houses. 146
VIII. ARTICLE VIII-HEARSAY
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove its truth constitutes hear-
say is often difficult to determine.147 ,, 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'' 48 One court decided
that letters concerning a physician's findings on examination and evaluation
of a patient were hearsay. 149 Another court ruled that invoices for reinstall-
ing and rewiring air conditioning units removed by the lessee were hearsay
absent testimony that the lessor paid the amount shown on the invoices.' 50
Car repair estimates, made out of court by a third party and offered to prove
the basis of the insured's opinion as to cash value were hearsay.' 5' The esti-
mates were still admissible, however, to show the insured's compliance with
the policy requirement to furnish proof of loss. 15 2
141. Blackmon v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 485 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. McGuffin v. Terrell, 732 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
143. Coxson v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 544, 548-49, 179 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1944).
144. Coxson, 142 Tex. at 548-49, 179 S.W.2d at 945.
145. McGailliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).
146. March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
147. TEX. R. EvID. 801-806 comprehensively defines the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Additionally, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." TEX. R. EvID. 602.
148. TEX. R. EvID. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or
by other rules prescribed the Supreme Court or by law." TEX. R. EVID. 802.
149. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 729 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
150. Tempo Tamers, Inc. v. Crow-Houston Four, Ltd., 715 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 732 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. App.-




In McCarty v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 15 3 an action to determine
whether a bank account was a survivorship account, an affidavit signed by a
depositor and two witnesses stating that the depositor wished to place money
she received from sale of minerals in joint accounts was inadmissible hear-
say. In Butler v. Hide-A-Way Lake Club, Inc. 154 the court held that state-
ments in summary judgment affidavits concerning factors a board of
directors considered in relocating an airstrip were not hearsay. The court
concluded that the party offered the affidavits to establish the good faith of
the directors rather than the truth of the matters asserted in the affidavits.155
B. Statements That Are Not Hearsay
Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e) excludes prior statements by a witness, 156
admissions by party-opponents, 157 and depositions from the definition of
hearsay.' 5 8
1. Admission By Party Opponent
a. Judicial Admissions-A judicially admitted fact does not require sup-
porting evidence, and the judicial admission establishes the fact as a matter
of law, thereby precluding the fact finder from making any contrary find-
ings. 159 A judicial admission is actually a substitute for evidence. 16° The
Texas Rules of Evidence, while not specifically distinguishing judicial admis-
sions from other admissions, treat admissions not as exceptions to the hear-
say rule, but rather as statements that are not hearsay. 16 1
Several courts considered judicial admissions during the Survey period.
The Dallas court of appeals had that an employee's admission that he had
resigned was a judicial admission precluding a finding of wrongful dis-
charge. 162 Another court determined that a party's stipulation that he
signed a promissory note as a guarantor was a judicial admission sufficient to
establish the guaranty. 163 The stipulation was an admission despite the
party's claim that the guaranty was unenforceable due to a violation of the
statute of frauds. 164 The Austin court of appeals found that a bankruptcy
trustee's testimony that the trustee claimed a right of occupation of leased
premises at least equal to any right of control of the owner was a judicial
153. 723 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 730
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
154. 730 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ).
155. Id.
156. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1).
157. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2).
158. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(3).
159. IA R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 1127 (3d ed. 1980).
160. Id.
161. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2).
162. Sacks v. Dallas Gold & Silver Exch., Inc., 720 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ).





admission.165 The admission precluded the trustee from asserting that the
premise owner was liable for an injury to the trustee as a business visitor. 1 66
Several courts held that a property owner's admission in his pleadings that
he was a holder of the note in dispute and that he received notice of an
appraisal order concerning his property were judicial admissions. 167 A
mother seeking dissolution of a joint managing conservatorship was not re-
quired to introduce evidence that the conservatorship was injurious to her
children's welfare since the father, in his pleadings, had admitted that the
conservatorship was injurious. 168 The Dallas court of appeals held that a
contrary judicial admission in a party's pleadings precluded a claim that
deed restrictions applied to a lot by mistake.169
To be considered a judicial admission, a statement must be deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal.1 70 In Hilliard v. Hilliard 71 the court of appeals
held that statements made by a wife and her attorney were not judicial ad-
missions because her husband received them in connection with the dissolu-
tion of a corporation. The court explained that the declarations against
interest might be considered some evidence that the house and lot were not
community property, but that the statements were not conclusive judicial
admissions. 172
b. Authorized Statements-Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) admits,
as admissions by party-opponents, statements by a person authorized to
make a statement concerning a subject. The Corpus Christi court of appeals
held that a statement by a party's lawyer was authorized by the party and,
therefore, was not hearsay.173
c. Vicarious Admissions-Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(D) provides
that admissions of agents or employees are admissible if they concern mat-
ters within the scope of employment and are made during the employment.
In State v. City of Greenville 174 a letter from the city's administrative assis-
165. Prestwood v. Taylor, 278 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
166. Id.
167. Underhill v. Jefferson County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, no writ); Home Say. Ass'n v. Guerra, 720 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).
168. Roach v. Roach, 735 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
169. Independent Am. Real Estate, Inc. v. Davis, 735 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ).
170. Kuehn v. Kuehn, 594 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ).
171. 725 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
172. Id.
173. Portland Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 540 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The attorney's statement
consisted of a letter to the trial court, written at the court's request, identifying certain docu-
ments as written by his client. 716 S.W.2d at 540. The appellate court held the attorney's
letter was an admission of the client's authorship and sufficient predicate to introduce the
documents as evidence. Id.
174. 726 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
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tant in the Department of Public Works to the State Bureau of Solid Waste
Management was admitted as a vicarious admission. The court reasoned
that the assistant was an employee of the city, the assistant accompanied the
state official to the site and discussed conditions there, and the letter was
written on city stationery, and the admissions were, therefore, chargeable to
the city. 175
C. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
1. Excited Utterance
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2) admits into evidence, as exceptions to the
hearsay rule, statements concerning a startling event made while under
stress caused by the event. In a case involving an automobile accident a
court held that an unidentified declarant's statement was not admissible as
an excited utterance because the declarant had not witnessed the accident. 176
Moreover, the declarant's statement related to alleged erratic driving before
the accident and not to the accident itself. 177
2. Recorded Recollection
A writing regarding a matter about which a witness once had personal
knowledge but no longer fully remembers is admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the writing was made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in his memory and reflects that knowledge accu-
rately. 178 Oral evidence from a magazine article's author regarding a corpo-
rate officer's statement was admissible to impeach the officer as a previously
recorded recollection, even though the magazine article itself was not
admissible. 179
3. Business Records
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of records of reg-
ularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records.180 Pre-
serving the statutory requirements of repealed article 3737(e), 18' Rule 803(6)
requires that the records be kept in the course of a regularly conducted busi-
ness activity, by a person with knowledge of the recorded information, and
as a regular practice of the business.' 8 2 If a party offering evidence fails to
meet these requirements, the records will be excluded, as occurred in two
175. Id.
176. Hughes Drilling Fluids, Inc. v. Eubanks, 729 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986), set aside, cause remanded, 742 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1987).
177. 729 S.W.2d at 764.
178. TEX. R. EVID. 803(5).
179. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 842 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
180. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6). Rule 902(10) permits the introduction of business records ac-
companied by an affidavit that conforms to the requirements set forth in that rule. TEX. R.
EvID. 902(10).
181. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737(e) (Vernon 1926), repealed by TEX. R. EvID.
(eff. Sept. 1, 1983) and TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. (eff. Sept. 1, 1986).
182. TEx. R. EvID. 803(6).
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cases decided during the Survey period. 183 Because the requirements of
Rule 803(6) were met, a well operator's invoices to a part owner of a work-
ing interest in a well were admissible as business records in the operator's
suit for the owner's share of expenses incurred in drilling the well.' 8 4 Also,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a credit memo from plaintiff
to defendant was admissible under the business records exception absent an
objection asserting the lack of proper predicate. 185
4. Public Records and Reports
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) lists as exceptions to the hearsay rule
records and reports of public offices setting forth their activities, matters
they have a legal duty to report, or factual findings resulting from legal in-
vestigations. Unlike Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6), Texas Rule of Evidence
803(8) does not impose a requirement that the preparer of a document have
personal knowledge of the facts in the report. In Clement v. Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety 186 the court of appeals held that an affidavit by a po-
lice officer was admissible even though the affiant did not have personal
knowledge of the facts. The court found the affidavit admissible as a record
kept by the custodian of public records. 8 7
5. Judgment of Previous Conviction
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(22), which permits the introduction of judg-
ments of previous convictions into evidence if the requirements of Rule
803(22) and Texas Rule of Evidence 609 are met, precludes parties from
introducing evidence of convictions if an appeal is pending. 18  In Juan A. v.
Dallas County Child Welfare 189 the court of appeals held that, unless the
requirements of both Rule 803(22) and Rule 609 are met, evidence of a con-
viction will be excluded. 190
D. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
Texas Rule of Evidence 804 contains exceptions to the hearsay rule that
apply if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 191 One such exception
183. Jones v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1397, 1400 (5th Cir. 1986); Powell-
Buick-Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bowers, 718 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
184. Texon Energy Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 733 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
185. Donnelley Mktg. v. Lionel Sosa, Inc., 716 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, no writ).
186. 726 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
187. Id.
188. TEX. R. EvID. 803(22); TEX. R. EvID. 609(e).
189. 726 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
190. Id. The State claimed the evidence of prior conviction should be admitted, despite the
pendency of appeal, because of the nature of the charge, injury to a child 14 years of age or
younger, and the nature of the case at bar, the involuntary termination of a parent-child rela-
tionship. The appellate court held the conviction inadmissible so long as an appeal was pend-
ing. Id.
191. TEX. R. EVID. 804. For the definition of unavailability, see TEX. R. EvID. 804(a).
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permits the use of testimony from depositions taken in different proceed-
ings. 192 During the Survey period the court in Smith v. Smith 193 admitted a
party's deposition given in a prior case. 194 The decision in Smith is probably
erroneous, as not only was the party available, but the party was actually
present during part of the trial.
IX. ARTICLE IX-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification of
evidence as a condition precedent to admitting the offered evidence. The
authentication requirement is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."' 95 In In re
Estate of Watson 196 a party stipulated that certain letters were from the de-
cedent and, therefore, the court could rule on the letters' admissibility. The
party also noted that he planned to require authentication if the trial court
found the letters admissible. The Texas Supreme Court held that the stipu-
lating party could not prevent proper authentication. 197
Texas Rule of Evidence 901(b) gives examples of authentication or identi-
fication conforming with the requirements of Rule 901(a). Rule 901(b)(1)
provides that a document may be authenticated by the testimony of a wit-
ness with knowledge.198 In In the Matter of Bobby Boggs, Inc. 199 the Fifth
Circuit interpreted Texas Rule of Evidence 901(b) as establishing prima facie
authentication of a defunct insurer's files and held that the affidavit of the
defunct insurer's receiver, which stated that he had personal knowledge of
the file, amounted to testimony by a knowledgeable witness.2°° Texas Rule
of Evidence 901 (b)(4) provides for authentication by distinctive characteris-
tics. In State v. City of Greenville20 1 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
the fact a letter from a city's administrative assistant was written on city
stationery was sufficient to authenticate the letter.
Texas Rule of Evidence 902 provides that certain documents are self-au-
192. TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
193. 720 S.W.2d 586, 599-600 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
194. Id. The court held the deposition would be admissible under any of three rationales.
The deposition might be an admission by a party-opponent under Rule 801(e)(2). 720 S.W.2d
at 599. The deposition might be admissible as former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). 720
S.W.2d at 599 (also citing Rule 804(a)(1) relating to witness unavailable on ground of privi-
lege). Or the deposition might be considered not hearsay under Rule 801(e)(3). 720 S.W.2d at
599. At the time of consideration of Smith, Rule 801(e)(3) provided any deposition "taken and
offered in accordance with the Texas rules of Civil Procedure" was not hearsay. An amend-
ment effective January 1, 1988, provides the deposition must be in the same proceeding. See
H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 341-15 (1988).
195. TEX. R. EVID. 901(a).
196. 720 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1986).
197. Id. at 808. Counsel claimed the stipulation was only for the purpose of obtaining a
ruling on admissibility under the dead man's statute, TEX. R. EvtD. 601(b); but the Supreme
Court said the stipulation in the record waived any subsequent requirement of authentication.
720 S.W.2d at 807-08.
198. TEX. R. EvID. 901(b)(1).
199. 819 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1987).
200. Id. at 581.
201. 726 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
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thenticating. During the Survey period a court of appeals held that pass-
ports are self-authenticating and refused to require extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility.202 Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 902(10)(a) allows admission of self-authenticating business records ac-
companied by an affidavit. 20 3 Two cases during the Survey period admitted
documents as business records because they were accompanied by affidavits
complying with the rule.204
X. ARTICLE X-CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the admission of con-
tents of writings, recordings, and photographs. Photographs20 5 portraying
relevant facts are admissible if identified by a witness as accurately represent-
ing the relevant facts.20 6 The authenticating witness does not have to be the
photographer, need not have been present at the photograph's taking and
does not need to have any knowledge regarding photography. 20 7 The wit-
ness must testify, however, that he knows the scene or object in question and
that the photograph accurately reflects the scene. 20 8 A change in the scene
or object photographed does not preclude the photograph's admission if a
witness explains the change and the photograph will help the jury under-
stand the conditions at the relevant time.209 Also, the length of time be-
tween the incident in question and the taking of the photograph does not
preclude admission if the photograph is identified as an accurate depiction of
conditions at the relevant time.210
Three cases during the Survey period considered these questions. The
Texas Supreme Court held that a witness who had viewed a body at the
murder scene was competent to authenticate photographs of the body taken
at the morgue even though the witness did not view the body at the
morgue.211 Photographs depicting the inside of a trailer in which the plain-
tiff driver was injured were held properly admitted, even though the photo-
202. Smith v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 586, 602 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
203. The affidavit must be by the custodian of the record or other qualified witness. TEX.
R. EVID. 902(10)(a) (referring to Rule 803(6)). The specific form of the affidavit is set out in
Rule 902(10)(b).
204. Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 732 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1987, no writ); Payne & Keller Co. v. Word, 732 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. "'Photographs' include still photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and motion pic-
tures." TEX. R. EvID. 1001(2).
206. See generally 2 R. RAY, supra note 159, § 1466 (photograph must be verified by wit-
ness before admissible in evidence).
207. See, e.g., Vardilos v. Reid, 320 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no
writ); 2 R. RAY, supra note 159, § 1466.
208. See McRoy v. River Lake Country Club, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 299, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 2 R. RAY, supra note 159, § 1466.
209. Howell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 380 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. Meehan v. Pickett, 463 S.W.2d 481,483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
211. Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. 1987).
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graphs were taken three years after the accident. 2 12  The driver
authenticated the photographs and testified that they looked like the inside
of the trailer on his last trip except for a new coat of paint. The exclusion of
a photograph depicting the improper positioning of patient's arm on a
gurney rail was affirmed in a medical malpractice case since the plaintiff
failed to show that the photograph accurately portrayed the relevant
facts. 2 13
Texas Rule of Evidence 1003 virtually eliminates the best evidence rule.
Rule 1003 permits the admission of a duplicate in place of an original unless
a party questions the authenticity of the original or if admission of the dupli-
cate in lieu of the original would be unfair. 214 During the Survey period
photomechanical duplicates of surety bonds were held admissible absent evi-
dence indicating that the duplicates did not fairly reproduce the originals. 215
Texas Rule of Evidence 1006 provides that the contents of voluminous
writings, recordings, or photographs, otherwise admissible, may be
presented in the form of a chart or other summary for the sake of conven-
ience. In Hilsher v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 2 16 a sum-
mary of interest the defendant owed to the plaintiff was found admissible
even though the expert witness whose testimony introduced the summary
lacked personal knowledge of the relevant interest rates. The court held that
the expert's lack of knowledge did not affect the admissibility of the sum-
mary, but only affected the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 217
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 218 A court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence if it finds a contract ambiguous. 219 The rule prohibits patrol evidence
concerning the terms in a contract if the contract is integrated. 220 Several
courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to interpret an un-
ambiguous written contract. 221 Several courts admitted parol evidence
212. Moore v. Cotter & Co., 726 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
213. Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ
granted).
214. TEX. R. EvID. 1003.
215. In the Matter of Bobby Boggs, Inc., 819 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1987).
216. 717 S.W.2d 435, 441-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
217. Id. at 441.
218. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 159, § 1601.
219. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
220. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement
intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 159,
§ 1602.
221. Meisler v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987); Universal Resources Corp. v.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1987); Willow Bend Nat'l Bank
v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 722 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bell v. Bell, 718 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Enserch




when the courts found the contracts at issue ambiguous. 222
The Texas Supreme Court admitted parol evidence to determine whether
an instrument, which on its face appeared to be a deed, was a deed or a
mortgage. 223 Parol evidence also was admitted to show fraud in induce-
ment 224 and to show representations concerning quality and benefits of serv-
ices alleged to be deceptive trade practices. 225 Parol evidence was not
admitted to establish that a lender represented to a guarantor that the guar-
antor would not be liable on a guaranty, since the guarantor failed to show
that the lender engaged in trickery, artifice, or devise in obtaining the
guaranty. 226
Two parol evidence cases decided during the Survey period are notable for
their unique holdings. One court admitted parol evidence to an admittedly
unambiguous written contract to explain any doubtful relationship of the
writing to the relations of the parties and the subject matter of the con-
tract. 227 Another court admitted parol evidence to show the non-existence
of a valid contract when a party alleged that a promissory note was executed
to reflect losses for business and tax purposes, but was not intended to create
a debt. 22 8
222. Texas Commerce Bank N.A. v. National Royalty Corp., 799 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th
Cir. 1986); United Interests, Inc. v. Brewington, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 897, 902-03 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co., 727 S.W.2d
289, 291-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lassiter v. Rotogravure
Comm., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. 1987).
224. Kneip v. Unitedbank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, no writ); FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Honeywell Inc. v. Imperial Condominium Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
226. Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
227. Lance Roof Inspection Service, Inc. v. Hardin, 653 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D. Tex.
1986) (citing Maxwell v. Lake, 674 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) and
Texas Utilities Fuel Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 615 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ)). The court looked at draft copies of the contract to determine if a restrictive covenant
should be construed literally. Id. at 1103.
228. Bill Shannon, Inc. v. San Clemente, 724 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, no writ).
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